The Quad brings together Australia, India, Japan and the United States around a shared vision of a free, open and resilient Indo-Pacific. Its importance extends beyond traditional security, as the region is increasingly shaped by competition across maritime, cyber, technological and information domains.
As digital platforms become central to how states receive and interpret information, protecting the information environment has become an increasingly important component of regional resilience. Information integrity is therefore an important shared regional concern, including cooperation to address foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), disinformation and other activities that can undermine regional security.
The Quad has consequently identified FIMI and disinformation as shared challenges requiring greater cooperation and information-sharing.
Member states
01Australia
02India
03Japan
04United States
Indo-Pacific · Quad member statesFig. 02
IND
JPN
AUS
USA
80°E120°E160°E160°W120°W80°W40°N20°N20°S40°S0°
IND
India
New Delhi
Fastest-growing digital public sphere; multilingual narrative contestation.
Quad cooperation: Countering Disinformation Working Group, 2024 → present.
India, New Delhi. Fastest-growing digital public sphere; multilingual narrative contestation. 2 documented cases: Pakistan-linked coordinated disinformation networks (2022); Operation Sindoor misinformation campaign (2025).
India, plotted at New Delhi: Fastest-growing digital public sphere; multilingual narrative contestation. Documented cases: Pakistan-linked coordinated disinformation networks (2022); Operation Sindoor misinformation campaign (2025).
Japan, plotted at Tokyo: Narratives across English, Chinese and Japanese language spaces. Documented cases: Fukushima / ALPS-treated water disinformation (2023); Okinawa / Ryukyu-related information manipulation (2024); Election-related foreign influence activity (2026).
Australia, plotted at Canberra: Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator; disinformation resilience in the Pacific. Documented cases: Chinese-linked Australian political influence campaign (2023).
United States, plotted at Washington, DC: Long-running FIMI attribution and platform-integrity work. Documented cases: Doppelganger (2024); Russian AI-enabled influence operation (2024).
Quad cooperation: Countering Disinformation Working Group, 2024 → present. The Quad has identified FIMI and disinformation as shared challenges requiring greater cooperation and information-sharing, and stood up a dedicated working group to carry that forward.
03Stakes
Why does the information environment matter?
Conflict is no longer limited to the physical battlefield.
States and other actors increasingly operate across conventional and digital domains, where information can be used to shape perceptions, influence political discussions, create uncertainty and affect how events are understood.
The rise of social media and digital platforms has made this environment faster, wider and more difficult to separate from everyday political discourse. Information operations can now reach audiences across borders and languages within a short period of time.
Speed
Faster
Information operations can reach audiences within a short period of time.
Reach
Wider
Narratives move across borders and languages rather than staying local.
Separation
Entangled
Harder to separate from ordinary, everyday political discourse.
04Definition
What is FIMI?
Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) refers to intentional and coordinated behaviour by foreign or foreign-linked actors that seeks to manipulate the information environment and potentially influence political processes, public debate or societal perceptions.
FIMI is broader than simply asking whether a piece of information is true or false.
It looks at
01Who is acting?
02What are they doing?
03What are they saying?
04How widely is it spreading?
05What effect might it have?
FIMI · Dimensions of assessmentFig. 04
FIMI
5 DIMENSIONS
01Actor
02Behaviour
03Content
04Degree
05Effect
The ABCDE frame
Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference is assessed across five dimensions rather than judged on content alone. Select one to read how it is used.
01ActorWho is acting?
02BehaviourWhat are they doing?
03ContentWhat are they saying?
04DegreeHow widely is it spreading?
05EffectWhat effect might it have?
Actor — Who is acting? The party behind the operation — a state, a state-linked proxy or a commercial intermediary — together with the infrastructure and assets it controls.
Behaviour — What are they doing? The tactics, techniques and procedures on display: coordination, inauthentic accounts, and the laundering of material between platforms and outlets.
Content — What are they saying? The narratives, claims and media assets themselves — across languages, formats and the platforms they are tailored for.
Degree — How widely is it spreading? Reach and amplification: how far the material travels, how quickly, and which audiences it actually lands with.
Effect — What effect might it have? The observable or intended impact on public discourse, institutional trust and decision-making — assessed rather than assumed.
05Framework
How do we identify potential information operations?
We use the ABCDE Framework: five dimensions, read together. Each asks a different question of the same activity.
A
A·Actor
Who is participating?
01 / 5
B
B·Behaviour
How are accounts posting, replying and amplifying?
02 / 5
C
C·Content
What narratives, claims and frames are being promoted?
03 / 5
D
D·Degree
How large, frequent and widespread is the activity?
04 / 5
E
E·Effect
How does the narrative spread across audiences and languages?
05 / 5
06Signals
Signals we examine
We examine a set of observable signals that can help identify unusual patterns of activity in the information environment. These signals are assessed together, allowing us to distinguish isolated activity from patterns that may indicate coordinated behaviour.
01
Volume surges
Sudden increases in activity.
02
Reply behaviour
Unusual concentrations of replies rather than original posts.
03
Follower distribution
Large numbers of very low-follower accounts.
04
Cross-lingual activity
Accounts moving narratives between language spaces.
05
Message discipline
Repeated framing with limited variation.
06
Account behaviour
Creation dates, posting patterns and network relationships.
07Trajectory
From conventional warfare to cognitive and information warfare
The instruments of contestation have not replaced one another so much as accumulated. Each era added a layer — and lowered the cost of reaching an adversary’s public directly. Eras below are approximate framings, not precise start dates.
01/approx. Pre-2000
Conventional warfare
Force projected through territory, materiel and manoeuvre.
02/approx. 2000s
Cyber operations
Networks become a domain — intrusion, disruption, exfiltration.
03/approx. 2010s
Information operations
The contest shifts to perception, at broadcast and social scale.
04/approx. 2016→
FIMI
Manipulative foreign behaviour treated as a discipline in its own right.
05/approx. 2023→
AI-enabled influence
Generative systems lower the cost of volume, persona and translation.
Shift in character
Qualitative · illustrative — not measured data
Reach
Bounded→Borderless
Speed
Days→Minutes
Attribution difficulty
Tractable→Contested
08Case studies
Country studies in the programme
The QUAD+ project maps information environments one country at a time. Japan is the first case; further studies will be published here.
We work with researchers, government agencies and enterprise teams across the Indo-Pacific. Get in touch to discuss the programme or a specific line of enquiry.