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Quad · Information Environment Research

QUAD: Mappingthe InformationEnvironment

Understanding narratives, information operations and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) across the Quad.

Explore the researchJapan project
  • Australia · India · Japan · United States
  • Observation window — Dec 2024 → Apr 2026

02Context

The Quad & the Information Environment

The Quad brings together Australia, India, Japan and the United States around a shared vision of a free, open and resilient Indo-Pacific. Its importance extends beyond traditional security, as the region is increasingly shaped by competition across maritime, cyber, technological and information domains.

As digital platforms become central to how states receive and interpret information, protecting the information environment has become an increasingly important component of regional resilience. Information integrity is therefore an important shared regional concern, including cooperation to address foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), disinformation and other activities that can undermine regional security.

The Quad has consequently identified FIMI and disinformation as shared challenges requiring greater cooperation and information-sharing.

Member states

  • 01Australia
  • 02India
  • 03Japan
  • 04United States

Contested domains

  • Maritime
  • Cyber
  • Technological
  • Information
Indo-Pacific · Quad member statesFig. 02
Map of the Indo-Pacific showing the four Quad membersA Mercator map spanning 42 degrees east to 64 degrees west and 60 degrees north to 53 degrees south, drawn from Natural Earth coastlines. India, Japan, Australia and the United States are shaded, and each is plotted as a node on its capital: New Delhi, Tokyo, Canberra and Washington DC. Lines drawn between the four are schematic ties, not routes. Japan is marked as the active case study.

Select a node — Australia, India, Japan or the United States — for its documented cases, or explore the cooperation between them.

  • India, plotted at New Delhi: Fastest-growing digital public sphere; multilingual narrative contestation. Documented cases: Pakistan-linked coordinated disinformation networks (2022); Operation Sindoor misinformation campaign (2025).
  • Japan, plotted at Tokyo (active case study): Active case study — narratives across English, Chinese and Japanese language spaces. Documented cases: Fukushima / ALPS-treated water disinformation (2023); Okinawa / Ryukyu-related information manipulation (2024); Election-related foreign influence activity (2026).
  • Australia, plotted at Canberra: Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator; disinformation resilience in the Pacific. Documented cases: Chinese-linked Australian political influence campaign (2023).
  • United States, plotted at Washington, DC: Long-running FIMI attribution and platform-integrity work. Documented cases: Doppelganger (2024); Russian AI-enabled influence operation (2024).
  • Quad cooperation: Countering Disinformation Working Group, 2024 → present. The Quad has identified FIMI and disinformation as shared challenges requiring greater cooperation and information-sharing, and stood up a dedicated working group to carry that forward.

03Stakes

Why does the information environment matter?

Conflict is no longer limited to the physical battlefield.

States and other actors increasingly operate across conventional and digital domains, where information can be used to shape perceptions, influence political discussions, create uncertainty and affect how events are understood.

The rise of social media and digital platforms has made this environment faster, wider and more difficult to separate from everyday political discourse. Information operations can now reach audiences across borders and languages within a short period of time.

Speed

Faster

Information operations can reach audiences within a short period of time.

Reach

Wider

Narratives move across borders and languages rather than staying local.

Separation

Entangled

Harder to separate from ordinary, everyday political discourse.

04Definition

What is FIMI?

Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) refers to intentional and coordinated behaviour by foreign or foreign-linked actors that seeks to manipulate the information environment and potentially influence political processes, public debate or societal perceptions.

FIMI is broader than simply asking whether a piece of information is true or false.

It looks at

  1. 01Who is acting?
  2. 02What are they doing?
  3. 03What are they saying?
  4. 04How widely is it spreading?
  5. 05What effect might it have?
FIMI · Dimensions of assessmentFig. 04
The five dimensions of FIMI arranged around a central nucleusFIMI sits at the centre as the parent node. Actor, Behaviour, Content, Degree and Effect radiate from it on spokes, each one a dimension the framework assesses.

The ABCDE frame

Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference is assessed across five dimensions rather than judged on content alone. Select one to read how it is used.

  • 01ActorWho is acting?
  • 02BehaviourWhat are they doing?
  • 03ContentWhat are they saying?
  • 04DegreeHow widely is it spreading?
  • 05EffectWhat effect might it have?
  • Actor — Who is acting? The party behind the operation — a state, a state-linked proxy or a commercial intermediary — together with the infrastructure and assets it controls.
  • Behaviour — What are they doing? The tactics, techniques and procedures on display: coordination, inauthentic accounts, and the laundering of material between platforms and outlets.
  • Content — What are they saying? The narratives, claims and media assets themselves — across languages, formats and the platforms they are tailored for.
  • Degree — How widely is it spreading? Reach and amplification: how far the material travels, how quickly, and which audiences it actually lands with.
  • Effect — What effect might it have? The observable or intended impact on public discourse, institutional trust and decision-making — assessed rather than assumed.

05Framework

How do we identify potential information operations?

Five dimensions, read together. Each asks a different question of the same activity.

  1. A·Actor

    Who is participating?

  2. B·Behaviour

    How are accounts posting, replying and amplifying?

  3. C·Content

    What narratives, claims and frames are being promoted?

  4. D·Degree

    How large, frequent and widespread is the activity?

  5. E·Effect

    How does the narrative spread across audiences and languages?

06Signals

Signals we examine

Observable behaviours in the data, read alongside one another rather than in isolation.

01

Volume surges

Sudden increases in activity.

02

Reply behaviour

Unusual concentrations of replies rather than original posts.

03

Follower distribution

Large numbers of very low-follower accounts.

04

Cross-lingual activity

Accounts moving narratives between language spaces.

05

Message discipline

Repeated framing with limited variation.

06

Account behaviour

Creation dates, posting patterns and network relationships.

07Trajectory

From conventional warfare to digital and information warfare

The instruments of contestation have not replaced one another so much as accumulated. Each era added a layer — and lowered the cost of reaching an adversary’s public directly. Eras below are approximate framings, not precise start dates.

  1. 01approx. Pre-2000

    Conventional warfare

    Force projected through territory, materiel and manoeuvre.

  2. 02approx. 2000s

    Cyber operations

    Networks become a domain — intrusion, disruption, exfiltration.

  3. 03approx. 2010s

    Information operations

    The contest shifts to perception, at broadcast and social scale.

  4. 04approx. 2016→

    FIMI

    Manipulative foreign behaviour treated as a discipline in its own right.

  5. 05approx. 2023→

    AI-enabled influence

    Generative systems lower the cost of volume, persona and translation.

Shift in character

Qualitative · illustrative — not measured data

Reach

BoundedBorderless

Speed

DaysMinutes

Attribution difficulty

TractableContested

08Case study

Japan Project — Mapping Japan’s Information Environment

As part of our broader QUAD project, this study examines Japan as the first case in mapping the information environments and emerging information threats across the Quad.

Japan is an important case for understanding how geopolitical competition increasingly extends into the information space. Our Japan project examines how narratives surrounding Japan’s security, foreign policy, domestic politics and regional alliances develop and spread across digital platforms.

The project is guided by three questions

What narratives are being propagated?

How are they being amplified?

Do amplification patterns appear organic or coordinated?

Background

FIMI and Japan

Japan’s information environment is increasingly becoming a domain of strategic competition. The Japanese government has identified foreign information manipulation and disinformation as emerging national-security concerns, particularly where they can influence public perceptions, undermine trust or affect Japan’s international relationships.

Source

Japan Cabinet Secretariat

Documented Cases

Source

Sasakawa Peace Foundation

FIMI in Japan

09Japan

Japan’s FIMI & Disinformation Cooperation

Seven agreements and dialogues between 2023 and 2026, from the trilateral response to ALPS-treated-water disinformation through to the first bilateral dialogue dedicated to FIMI.

  1. 2023

    JapanUnited StatesROK

    Japan–US–ROK

    Coordination against ALPS-treated-water disinformation.

    14 July 2023

  2. 2024

    JapanAustralia

    Japan–Australia 2+2

    Strategic communications and countering foreign information manipulation.

    5 September 2024

  3. 2024

    JapanAustraliaIndiaUnited States

    Quad

    Countering Disinformation Working Group and a resilient information environment.

    29 July / 21 September 2024

  4. 2024

    JapanEuropean Union

    Japan–EU Security and Defence Partnership

    FIMI included under cooperation on hybrid threats.

    1 November 2024

  5. 2025

    JapanNATO

    Japan–NATO

    Strategic communications and countering disinformation.

    3 February 2025

  6. 2025

    JapanThailand

    Japan–Thailand

    Exchange of knowledge and experience on countering disinformation and misinformation.

    12 May 2025

  7. 2026

    JapanEuropean Union

    Japan–EU FIMI Dialogue

    First dedicated bilateral dialogue on FIMI.

    3 June 2026

10At a glance

Upcoming reports on Japan

The scope of the Japan study, as it currently stands.

Observation window

Dec 2024Apr 2026

Continuous collection across the study period.

Narratives analysed

0

Distinct narrative clusters traced across the period.

Language spaces

0

English · Chinese · Japanese

11Dashboard

Explore the data

Explore the data behind the research through an interactive dashboard.

Coming soon

12Research

Explore the research

Four report tracks from the Japan study. Each is in preparation and will be published here.

01Methodology

Mapping the Information Environment in Japan

How we investigate narratives, amplification, account behaviour and potential foreign information manipulation.

Coming soon
02Defence & Militarisation

Japan's Defence and Militarisation Narratives

Examining narratives surrounding Japan's military posture, defence policy and the framing of the 'China threat.'

Coming soon
03Alliance & Sovereignty

Japan's Alliances, Maritime Disputes & Internal Affairs

Examining narratives around Japan-NATO relations, maritime disputes and sovereignty.

Coming soon
04Event-Based Narratives

Events, Elections & Information Activity

Exploring how major events can trigger narrative mobilisation, including the seafood-ban and election-bot narratives.

Coming soon

13What’s next

What’s next

Japan is the first component of our wider QUAD information-environment research. Further country and thematic studies will expand this work across the Quad.

Programme sequence

  1. Japan

    Active

    First case study — mapping in progress.

  2. Australia

    Forthcoming

    Scoped as part of the wider Quad programme.

  3. India

    Forthcoming

    Scoped as part of the wider Quad programme.

  4. United States

    Forthcoming

    Scoped as part of the wider Quad programme.

Working on the same questions?

We work with researchers, government agencies and enterprise teams across the Indo-Pacific. Get in touch to discuss the programme or a specific line of enquiry.

Get in touchcontact@thinkfi.net